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Abstract
We consider the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist via a non-Myersonian approach
that could generalize to multiple items and multiple buyers. Although such an approach does not lead
to any closed-form solution of the problem, it does provide some insights to this problem from different
angles. In particular, we consider both Bayesian (Bayesian Incentive Compatible + Bayesian Individu-
ally Rational) and Dominant-Strategy (Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible + ex-post Individually
Rational) implementations, where all the buyers have additive valuations and quasi-linear utilities and
all the valuations are independent across buyers (not necessarily independent across items).
e main technique of our approach is to formulate the problem as an LP (probably with exponen-
tial size) and apply primal-dual analysis. We observe that any optimal solution of the dual program
naturally defines the virtual value functions for the primal revenue maximization problem in the sense
that any revenue maximizing auction must be a virtual welfare maximizer (cf. Myerson’s auction for
single item Myerson [1981]).1
Based on this observation, we have the following results (most of them are previously unknown
for the multi-item multi-buyer seing):
1. We characterize a sufficient and necessary condition for BIC = DSIC, i.e., the optimal revenue of
Bayesian implementations equals to the optimal revenue of dominant-strategy implementations
(BRev = DRev). e condition is if and only if the optimal DSIC revenue DRev can be achieved
by a DSIC and ex-post IR virtual welfare maximizer with buyer-independent virtual value functions
(buyer i’s virtual value is independent with other buyers’ valuations).
2. In light of the characterization, we further show that when all the valuations are i.i.d., it is further
equivalent to that separate-selling is optimal. In particular, it respects one result from the recent
breakthrough work on the exact optimal solutions in the multi-item multi-buyer seing by Yao
[2016].
3. We also observe that dual programs can be interpreted as the optimal transport problem. is
result is previously shown by Daskalakis et al. [2013, 2015] for the single buyer seing. us we
automatically obtain a generalized version for the multi-buyer seing.2
4. We provide an alternative proof of Myerson’s auction. In particular, we can directly start with
solving the optimal DSIC and ex-post IR auction instead of first solving the optimal Bayesian
implementation then showing that it is also a dominant-strategy implementation.
∗We thank Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, and Balasubramanian Sivan for their helpful comments and
advice on an earlier version of the manuscript.
†Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. songzuo.z@gmail.com .
1It is in fact implied by Cai et al. [2012], while our results stand on the exact form of the virtual value functions.
2For the multi-buyer seing, the dual program is a generalized version of optimal transport problem.
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1 Introduction
Roadmap We introduce our notations and the common definitions in Section 2. We apply the dual
analysis and define virtual values in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our main characterization and we
then show that in Section 5 for the i.i.d. seing, such a charaterization implies that DSIC = BIC if and only
if separate-selling is optimal.
2 Notations
roughout this manuscript, we use subscripts i to indicate buyers and superscripts
j to indicate items. We
also use boldface (without subscript) notations for vectors across all the buyers (e.g., matrices for allocation
x and value v while vectors for payments p) and notations without superscripts (but with subscripts) for
vectors across all the items for some certain buyer (e.g., allocation xi and value vi of buyer i, while both are
vectors). As a general convention, we use subscripts −i for the vectors without the element(s) for buyer i
and [n] = 1, . . . , n for the set of buyers and [m] = 1, . . . ,m for the set of items. We also use · to emphasize
the inner product of between two vectors.
As we will consider both Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementations, we use variables with ¯
for Bayesian implementations (e.g., x¯i(v) and p¯i(v)) while those without ¯ for dominant-strategy imple-
mentations (e.g., xi(v) and pi(v)).
We consider the case where the buyers have independent values with each other (yet the values of the
same buyer for different items might be correlated). e values are additive and the utilities are quasi-
linear. We will formalize the definitions later.
For ease of using linear programs, we consider discrete distributions with finite supports.3
2.1 Direct Auctions
A direct auction M = 〈x, p〉 consists of the allocation x : Rn×m
+
→ [0, 1]n×m and the payment p : Rn×m
+
→
R
n
+
. e utility of each buyer i is
ui(v) = vi · xi(v) − pi(v) =
∑
j∈[m]
v
j
i
x
j
i
(v) − pi(v).
For any value profile v ∈ Rn×m
+
, the allocation and payment must satisfy the following feasibility
constraint, ∀ j ∈ [m], v ∈ Rn×m
+
,
1 · x j(v) =
∑
i∈[n]
x
j
i
(v) ≤ 1.
We use µ to denote the probability measure of the common prior knowledge on the private values. In
particular, since the values are independent across buyers, µ(v) can be wrien as
µ(v) = µ1(v1)µ2(v2) · · · µn(vn).
LetVi ⊆ R
m
+
be any finite support of the prior distribution of buyer i, namely,
∀vi ∈ Vi, µi(vi) ≥ 0, and
∑
vi ∈Vi
µi(vi) = 1.
Write V = V1 × V2 × · · · × Vn. In particular, we will assume that ∀vi , 0, µi(vi) > 0 to simplify the
discussion of corner cases.
3Generalization to arbitrary distribution (if possible) would require linear programs for infinite dimensions.
2
2.2 Bayesian Implementation
A direct mechanism M¯ = 〈x¯, p¯〉 is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC), if ∀vi, v
′
i
∈ Rm
+
,
E
v−i
[vi · x¯i(v) − p¯i(v)] ≥ E
v−i
[
vi · x¯i(v
′
i, v−i) − p¯i(v
′
i, v−i)
]
; (BIC)
Bayesian Individually Rational (BIR), if ∀vi ∈ R
m
+
,
E
v−i
[vi · x¯i(v) − p¯i(v)] ≥ 0. (BIR)
By restricting to the support space V, we can define the optimal Bayesian direct mechanism as the
following linear program:
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
p¯i(v) (BLP)
s.t.
∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(vi · x¯i(v) − p¯i(v)) ≥
∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(vi · x¯i(v
′
i, v−i) − p¯i(v
′
i, v−i)), ∀i ∈ [n], vi, v
′
i ∈ Vi∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(vi · x¯i(v) − p¯i(v)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], vi ∈ Vi∑
i
x¯
j
i
(v) ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ [m], v ∈ V
x¯
j
i
(v), p¯i(v) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], v ∈ V
Although any feasible solution to this linear program only defines the allocation and payments for the
value profiles in the support space and the BIC and BIR properties are only guaranteed within the support
space, there is a standard extension method to recover the Bayesian implementation that is (i) defined on
the full value space Rn×m
+
, (ii) BIC and BIR (on the full value space), and (iii) consistent with the given
feasible solution on support spaceV .
Lemma 2.1 (Bayesian Extension). Given any feasible solution (x¯, p¯) to BLP, the extended direct mechanism
(x¯ ′, p¯′) defined as follows satisfies BIC and BIR.
x¯
′(v) = x¯(v′), p¯′(v) = p¯(v′)
where ∀i ∈ [n], if vi ∈ Vi, v
′
i = vi
otherwise, v′i = argmax
vi ∈Vi
E
v−i
[
v
′
i · x¯i(vi, v−i) − p¯i(vi, v−i)
]
.
2.3 Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Adirectmechanism M = 〈x, p〉 is Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC), if∀v ∈ Rn×m
+
, v′
i
∈ Rm
+
,
vi · xi(v) − pi(v) ≥ vi · xi(v
′
i, v−i) − pi(v
′
i, v−i); (DSIC)
Ex-post Individually Rational (epIR), if ∀v ∈ Rn×m
+
,
vi · xi(v) − pi(v) ≥ 0. (epIR)
3
Similarly, we have the following linear program for optimal dominant-strategy direct mechanisms:
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
pi(v) (DSLP)
s.t. vi · xi(v) − pi(v) ≥ vi · xi(v
′
i, v−i) − pi(v
′
i, v−i), ∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ V, v
′
i ∈ Vi
vi · xi(v) − pi(v) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], vi ∈ Vi∑
i
x
j
i
(v) ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ [m], v ∈ V
x
j
i
(v), pi(v) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], v ∈ V
Again, any feasible solution to this linear program is only a limited dominant-strategy implementation,
while the following lemma (first by Dobzinski et al. [2011]) provides an extension method similar to the
Bayesian case.
Lemma 2.2 (Dominant-Strategy Extension). Given any feasible solution (x, p) to DSLP, the extended direct
mechanism (x ′, p′) defined as follows satisfies DSIC and epIR.
x
′(v) = x(v′), p′(v) = p(v′)
where ∀i ∈ [n], if v ∈ V, v′ = v
else if v−i ∈ V−i, v
′
i = argmax
vi ∈Vi
v
′
i · xi(vi, v−i) − pi(vi, v−i)
otherwise, v′i = 0.
erefore, from now on, we will only focus on the value spaceV.
2.4 Separate Selling
By separate-selling, we mean to sell each of the item independently via the Myerson’s auction. We use
SRev to denote the revenue of separate-selling.
3 Dual Programs and Virtual Values
Now we write down the corresponding dual programs. In particular, we will omit the “for-all” quantifiers
on the free variables in the rest of the paper.
3.1 Dominant-Strategy Implementation
3.1.1 Duality and Complementary Slackness
First for dominant-strategy implementation, let ζi(vi, v
′
i
; v−i), ηi(v), and ξ
j(v) be the corresponding multi-
pliers of the constraints. By reorganizing DSLP into the standard form, we obtain,
4
Primal Dominant-Strategy
x
j
i
(v), pi(v) ≥ 0 variables
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
pi(v) objective
s.t. − vi · xi(v) + pi(v) + vi · xi(v
′
i, v−i) − pi(v
′
i, v−i) ≤ 0 ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)
− vi · xi(v) + pi(v) ≤ 0 ηi(v)∑
i
x
j
i
(v) ≤ 1 ξ j(v)
Hence the dual program is
Dual Dominant-Strategy
ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i), ηi(v), ξ
j(v) ≥ 0 variables
min
∑
v
∑
j
ξ j(v) objective
s.t. ξ j(v) −
©­«ηi(v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζi(v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)ª®¬ ≥ 0 x
j
i
(v)
ηi(v) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζi(v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
≥ µ(v) pi(v)
(Dual DSLP)
We then use P to denote the polytope of all feasible solutions of the primal linear program, and simi-
larly D for the polytope of the dual linear program. For ease of notation, we use the following abbrevia-
tions:
For primal: ∆ui(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) = vi · xi(v
′
i, v−i) − pi(v
′
i, v−i) − (vi · xi(v) + pi(v))
ui(v) = vi · xi(v) + pi(v)
s j(v) =
∑
i
x
j
i
(v)
For dual: φ
j
i
(v) = ηi(v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζi(v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
ψi(v) = ηi(v) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζi(v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
en the primal and dual look like
Primal x
j
i
(v), pi(v) ≥ 0 vars
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
pi(v) obj
s.t. ∆ui(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) ≤ 0 ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)
− ui(v) ≤ 0 ηi(v)
s j(v) ≤ 1 ξ j(v)
Dual ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i), ηi(v), ξ
j(v) ≥ 0 vars
min
∑
v
∑
j
ξ j(v) obj
s.t. ξ j(v) − φ
j
i
(v) ≥ 0 x
j
i
(v)
ψi(v) ≥ µ(v) pi(v)
Clearly, bothP andD are always nonempty, andP is bounded. Now, suppose pi∗ = 〈x∗
j
i
(v), p∗
i
(v)〉 ∈ P
is an optimal solution of the primal, and δ∗ = 〈ζ∗
i
(vi, v
′
i
; v−i), η
∗
i
(v), ξ∗ j(v)〉 ∈ D is an optimal solution of
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the dual. By strong duality theorem, we know that obj(pi∗) = obj(δ∗), which is the optimal revenue of any
dominant-strategy implementation, denoted by DRev:
DRev = obj(pi∗) =
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
p∗i (v) = obj(δ
∗) =
∑
v
∑
j
ξ∗
j
(v).
Finally, we add slack variables to both primal and dual:
Primal x
j
i
(v), pi(v) ≥ 0 variables
ai(vi, v
′
i ; v−i), bi(v), c
j(v) ≥ 0 slack variables
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
pi(v) objective
s.t. ∆ui(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) + ai(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) = 0 ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)
− ui(v) + bi(v) = 0 ηi(v)
s j(v) + c j(v) = 1 ξ j(v)
Dual ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i), ηi(v), ξ
j(v) ≥ 0 variables
α
j
i
(v), βi(v) ≥ 0 slack variables
min
∑
v
∑
j
ξ j(v) objective
s.t. ξ j(v) − φ
j
i
(v) − α
j
i
(v) = 0 x
j
i
(v)
ψi(v) − βi(v) = µ(v) pi(v)
In what follows, we will abuse the notationP andD as the feasible polytopes for both normal variables
and slack variables for primal and dual, respectively.
Complementary Slackness For any feasible primal solution pi ∈ P and dual solution δ ∈ D, they are
the optimal solution for primal and dual if and only if:
ai(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) = 0, bi(v)ηi(v) = 0, c
j (v)ξ j(v) = 0
α
j
i
(v)x
j
i
(v) = 0, βi(v)pi(v) = 0.
In particular, the gap between primal and dual objectives equals the sum of all the products.
obj(δ) − obj(pi) =
∑
i,v,v′
i
,vi
ai(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) +
∑
i,v
bi(v)ηi(v) (DSCS)
+
∑
j,v
c j(v)ξ j(v) +
∑
i, j,v
α
j
i
(v)x
j
i
(v) +
∑
i,v
βi(v)pi(v).
We then focus on interpreting the complementary slackness conditions.
3.1.2 Virtual Values
For any fixed optimal solutions pi∗ ∈ P and δ∗ ∈ D, since α∗
j
i
(v)x∗
j
i
(v) = 0, we conclude that:
x∗
j
i
(v) > 0 =⇒ 0 = α∗
j
i
(v) = ξ∗
j
(v) − φ∗
j
i
(v).
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In particular, it also implies that item j is only allocated to the buyer(s) i with maximum φ∗
j
i
(v):
∀i′ ∈ [n], φ∗
j
i
(v) = ξ∗
j
(v) ≥ φ∗
j
i′
(v),
where the inequality is the first constraint of the dual program (ξ j(v) − φ
j
i
(v) ≥ 0).
Moreover, by c∗ j(v)ξ∗ j(v) = 0, we obtain:
1 −
∑
i
x∗
j
i
= c∗
j
(v) > 0 =⇒ 0 = ξ∗ j(v) ≥ φ∗
j
i′
(v), ∀i′ ∈ [n],
which implies that item j is not fully allocated only if for all buyer i′, φ∗
j
i′
(v) is not strictly positive.
Definition 3.1 (Expected Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ∗, φ∗
j
i
(v) defines the expected
virtual values in the sense that any optimal auction must maximize the expected virtual welfare.
Note that the expected virtual values are different from the virtual values commonly used in revenue
maximization literatures. For example, virtual values are not always well-defined for some extreme cases
(such as discrete/unbounded distributions and distributions with point masses), while the expected virtual
values are always explicitly defined by an dual optimal solution. Later in eorem 3.2, we will formally
define the virtual values in our seing as analog to common virtual values (e.g., Myerson’s virtual value).
eorem 3.2 (Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ∗ satisfying certain regularization conditions
(defined later), there exists corresponding virtual value functions ϕ
j
i
: V → R ∪ {−∞} such that
ϕ
j
i
(v)µ(v) = φ∗
j
i
(v).
In particular,
ϕ
j
i
(v) =

φ∗
j
i
(v)/µ(v), if µ(v) > 0;
some real number in R, if µ−i(v−i) = 0;
−∞, if vi = 0, µi(0) = 0, µ−i(v−i) > 0.
Moreover, any optimal auction (optimal primal solution) pi∗ must be a virtual welfare maximizer:
1. Each item is only allocated to the buyer(s) with the highest and non-negative virtual value on this item;
2. e highest virtual value for any unallocated (or partially allocated) item must be non-positive (for
partially allocated items, the highest virtual value must be zero).
e basic idea is to simply define ϕ
j
i
(v) = φ∗
j
i
(v)/µ(v), while it only works when µ(v) > 0. For those
v ∈ V such that µ(v) = 0, the virtual value ϕ
j
i
(v) can be defined only if φ∗
j
i
(v) = 0 as well.
Hence the first regularization condition is:
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], µ−i(v−i) = 0 =⇒ φ
∗ j
i
(v) = 0. (1)
Besides, we will require two more regularization conditions to simplify the discussion in upcoming
sections, which are:
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], vi , 0, η
∗
i (v) = 0 and η
∗
i (0, v−i) = µ−i(v−i), (2)
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], β∗i (v) = ψ
∗
i (v) − µ(v) = 0. (3)
By our previous interpretations on some of the complementary slackness conditions, we remain to
prove the following lemma:
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Lemma 3.3 (Regular Dual OPT). ere always exists an optimal dual solution δ∗ satisfying the regularization
condition (1), (2), and (3).4
Proof of eorem 3.2. Directly implied by Lemma 3.3. 
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3, we can reformulate φ∗
j
i
(v) as follows,
φ∗
j
i
(v) = ψ∗i (v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
) = µ(v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)
=⇒ ϕ
j
i
(v) = v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)/µ(v). (DSVV)
3.2 Bayesian Implementation
3.2.1 Duality and Complementary Slackness
Now, for Bayesian implementation, let ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i
), η¯i(vi), and ξ¯
j(v) be the corresponding multipliers of the
constraints. By reorganizing BLP into the standard form, we obtain,
Primal Bayesian
x¯
j
i
(v), p¯i(v) ≥ 0 variables
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
p¯i(v) objective
s.t.
∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(−vi · x¯i(v) + p¯i(v) + vi · x¯i(v
′
i, v−i) − p¯i(v
′
i, v−i)) ≤ 0 ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i )∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(−vi · xi(v) + p¯i(v)) ≤ 0 η¯i(vi)∑
i
x¯
j
i
(v) ≤ 1 ξ¯ j(v)
Hence the dual program is
Dual Bayesian
ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ), η¯i(vi), ξ¯
j(v) ≥ 0 variables
min
∑
v
∑
j
ξ¯ j(v) objective
s.t. ξ¯ j(v) − µ−i(v−i)
©­«η¯i(vi)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i )v
j
i
− ζ¯i(v
′
i, vi)v
′ j
i
)ª®¬ ≥ 0 x¯
j
i
(v)
µ−i(v−i)
©­«η¯i(vi) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ) − ζ¯i(v
′
i, vi)
)ª®¬ ≥ µ(v) p¯i(v)
(Dual BLP)
4We note that some of the optimal dual solution δ∗ may not satisfy these regularization, but there always exist the ones satisfy
them.
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Similarly, we then use P¯ to denote the polytope of all feasible solutions of the Bayesian primal linear
program, D¯ for the polytope of the Bayesian dual linear program, and the following abbreviations:
For primal: ∆u¯i(vi, v
′
i ) =
∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)
(
vi · x¯i(v
′
i, v−i) − p¯i(v
′
i, v−i) − (vi · x¯i(v) + p¯i(v))
)
u¯i(vi) =
∑
v−i
µ−i(v−i)(vi · x¯i(v) + p¯i(v))
s¯ j(v) =
∑
i
x¯
j
i
(v)
For dual: φ¯
j
i
(vi) = η¯i(vi)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i )v
j
i
− ζ¯i(v
′
i, vi)v
′ j
i
)
ψ¯i(vi) = η¯i(vi) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ) − ζ¯i(v
′
i, vi)
)
Clearly, both P¯ and D¯ are always nonempty, and P¯ is bounded. Now, suppose p¯i∗ = 〈x¯∗
j
i
(v), p¯∗
i
(v)〉 ∈ P¯
is an optimal solution of the primal, and δ¯∗ = 〈ζ¯∗
i
(vi, v
′
i
), η¯∗
i
(vi), ξ¯∗
j
(v)〉 ∈ D¯ is an optimal solution of the
dual. By strong duality theorem, we know that obj(pi∗) = obj(δ¯∗), which is the optimal revenue of any
Bayesian implementation, denoted by BRev:
BRev = obj(pi∗) =
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
p¯∗i (v) = obj(δ¯
∗) =
∑
v
∑
j
ξ¯∗
j
(v).
Again, we add slack variables to both primal and dual:
Primal x¯
j
i
(v), p¯i(v) ≥ 0 variables
a¯i(vi, v
′
i ), b¯i(vi), c¯
j(v) ≥ 0 slack variables
max
∑
v
µ(v)
∑
i
p¯i(v) objective
s.t. ∆u¯i(vi, v
′
i ) + a¯i(vi, v
′
i ) = 0 ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i )
− u¯i(vi) + b¯i(vi) = 0 η¯i(vi)
s¯ j(v) + c¯ j(v) = 1 ξ¯ j(v)
Dual ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ), η¯i(vi), ξ¯
j(v) ≥ 0 variables
α¯
j
i
(v), β¯i(v) ≥ 0 slack variables
min
∑
v
∑
j
ξ¯ j(v) objective
s.t. ξ¯ j(v) − µ−i(v−i)φ¯
j
i
(vi) − α¯
j
i
(v) = 0 x¯
j
i
(v)
µ−i(v−i)ψ¯i(vi) − β¯i(v) = µ(v) p¯i(v)
As we did for dominant-strategy implementation, we will abuse the notation P¯ and D¯ as the feasible
polytopes for both normal variables and slack variables of primal and dual, respectively.
Complementary Slackness For any feasible primal solution pi ∈ P¯ and dual solution δ¯ ∈ D¯, they are
the optimal solution for primal and dual if and only if:
a¯i(vi, v
′
i )ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ) = 0, b¯i(vi)η¯i(vi) = 0, c¯
j(v)ξ¯ j(v) = 0
α¯
j
i
(v)x¯
j
i
(v) = 0, β¯i(v)p¯i(v) = 0.
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In particular, the gap between primal and dual objectives equals the sum of all the products.
obj(δ¯) − obj(pi) =
∑
i,v′
i
,vi
a¯i(vi, v
′
i )ζ¯i(vi, v
′
i ) +
∑
i,vi
b¯i(vi)η¯i(vi) (BCS)
+
∑
j,v
c¯ j(v)ξ¯ j(v) +
∑
i, j,v
α¯
j
i
(v)x¯
j
i
(v) +
∑
i,v
β¯i(v)p¯i(v).
3.2.2 (Bayesian) Virtual Values
We then repeat the interpreting of the complementary slackness conditions as we did for the dominant-
strategy implementation. In particular, we can conclude that µ−i(v−i)φ¯∗
j
i
(v) is the expected virtual value
in Bayesian seing:
Definition 3.4 (Expected (Bayesian) Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ¯∗, µ−i(v−i)φ¯∗
j
i
(v) de-
fines the expected (Bayesian) virtual values in the sense that any optimal auction must maximize the expected
virtual welfare.
Similarly, we can define virtual values for Bayesian implementations.
eorem 3.5 ((Baysian) Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ¯∗ satisfying certain regularization
conditions (defined later), there exists corresponding virtual value functions ϕ¯
j
i
: Vi → R ∪ {−∞} such that
ϕ¯
j
i
(vi)µ(v) = φ¯∗
j
i
(vi)µ−i(v−i).
In particular,
ϕ¯
j
i
(vi) =

φ¯∗
j
i
(vi)/µi(vi), if µ(v) > 0;
some real number in R, if µ−i(v−i) = 0;
−∞, if vi = 0, µi(0) = 0, µ−i(v−i) > 0.
Moreover, any optimal auction (optimal primal solution) pi∗ must be a virtual welfare maximizer:
1. Each item is only allocated to the buyer(s) with the highest and non-negative virtual value on this item;
2. e highest virtual value for any unallocated (or partially allocated) item must be non-positive (for
partially allocated items, the highest virtual value must be zero).
e corresponding regularization conditions are as follows:
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], µ−i(v−i) = 0 =⇒ φ¯∗
j
i
(vi) = 0 (4)
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], vi , 0, η¯
∗
i (vi) = 0 and η¯
∗
i (0) = 1, (5)
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [n], β¯∗i (v) = µ−i(v−i)ψ¯
∗
i (vi) − µ(v) = 0. (6)
By our previous interpretations on some of the complementary slackness conditions, we remain to
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6 (Regular Dual OPT). ere always exists an optimal dual solution δ∗ satisfying the regularization
condition (4), (5), and (6).5
5We note that some of the optimal dual solution δ∗ may not satisfy these regularization, but there always exist the ones satisfy
them.
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Proof of eorem 3.5. Directly implied by Lemma 3.6. 
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.6, we can reformulate φ¯∗
j
i
(vi) as follows,
φ¯∗
j
i
(vi) = ψ¯
∗
i (vi)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ¯∗i (v
′
i, vi)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
) = µi(vi)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ¯∗i (v
′
i, vi)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)
=⇒ ϕ¯
j
i
(vi) = v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ¯∗i (v
′
i, vi)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)/µi(vi). (BVV)
4 Characterization
In this section, we present the sufficient and necessary characterization of BIC = DSIC.
4.1 A sufficient and necessary condition of BIC = DSIC
In previous sections, we defined two types of virtual values, i.e., dominant-strategy virtual values (DSVV)
and Bayesian virtual values (BVV). In particular, the Bayesian virtual values for buyer i, ϕ¯
j
i
(vi), are inde-
pendent of the values of other buyers by the construction, while the dominant-strategy virtual values for
buyer i, ϕ
j
i
(v), depend on the values of other buyers as well.
We say the (regular) dominant-strategy virtual values are agent-independent, if for each buyer i, her
virtual values (and related dual variables, ηi(v) and ζi(vi, v
′
i
; v−i)) are independent of the values of other
buyers:
∀vi ∈ Vi, v−i, v
′
−i, ∈ V−i, ϕi(vi, v−i) = ϕi(vi, v
′
−i),
ηi(v)µ−i(v
′
−i) = ηi(vi, v
′
−i)µ−i(v−i), ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i)µ−i(v
′
−i) = ζi(vi, v
′
i ; v
′
−i)µ−i(v−i).
(AI)
en our first main result is the following characterization:
eorem 4.1. BIC = DSIC if and only if that there is an optimal DSIC auction that is induced by agent-
independent virtual values.
Proof of eorem 4.1. “=⇒”:
One key observation is that any solution of Dual BLP induces a solution of Dual DSLP. In particular,
let δ¯∗ = 〈ζ¯∗
i
(v′
i
, vi), η¯
∗
i
(vi), ξ¯∗
j
(v)〉 ∈ D¯ be an optimal solution to Dual BLP. e following δˆ constructed
from δ¯∗ is a feasible solution to Dual DSLP:
δˆ = 〈ζˆi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i), ηˆi(v), ξˆ
j(v)〉
ζˆi(vi, v
′
i ; v−i) = ζ¯
∗
i (v
′
i, vi)µ−i(v−i)
ηˆi(v) = η¯
∗
i (vi)µ−i(v−i)
ξˆ j(v) = ξ¯∗
j
(v).
We omit the verification of δˆ ∈ D, which is directly implied by the definition of Dual BLP and
Dual DSLP (as well as the fact that µ−i(v−i) ≥ 0).
In the meanwhile, note that the objective value of δ¯∗ in Dual BLP is the same as the objective value of
δˆ in Dual DSLP, we conclude that:
obj(δ¯∗) = obj(δˆ) ≥ obj(δ∗),
where δ∗ is an optimal solution of Dual DSLP and the last inequality is from the optimality of δ∗.
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On the other hand, by the hypothesis that BIC = DSIC, i.e., obj(δ¯∗) = obj(δ∗), the constructed solution
δˆ is in fact an optimal solution to Dual DSLP.
Since δ¯∗ is an arbitrary optimal solution toDual BLP,we can further assume that it is regular (Lemma 3.6).
e corresponding δˆ then is also regular according to the definition in Lemma 3.3 (we omit the verification
here, which is straightforward by the definitions). erefore, δˆ defines the virtual values for an optimal
DSIC auction (DSVV):
ϕˆ
j
i
(v) = v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζˆi(v
′
i, vi ; v−i)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)/µ(v)
= v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ¯∗i (v
′
i, vi)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)/µi(vi).
In particular, the virtual values are the same as (BVV) and are agent-independent. (ηˆi(v)/µ−i(v−i) and
ζˆi(vi, v
′
i
; v−i)/µ−i(v−i) are also invariant in v−i .)
“⇐=”:
By the hypothesis that there exist agent-independent virtual values δ∗ = 〈ζ∗
i
(v′
i
, vi ; v−i), η
∗
i
(v), ξ∗ j(v)〉
inducing an optimal DSIC auction, we can construct the following δ˜, which is a feasible solution to
Dual BLP:
δ˜ = 〈ζ˜i(v
′
i, vi ; v−i), η˜i(v), ξ˜
j(v)〉
ζ˜i(v
′
i, vi) = ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)/µ−i(v−i)
η˜i(vi) = η
∗
i (v)/µ−i(v−i)
ξ˜ j(v) = ξ∗
j
(v).
Note that according to the definiton of agent-independence (AI), the construction of δ˜ is consistent for
all v−i . In particular, if µ−i(v−i) = 0, for all v
′
−i
∈ V−i , by (AI),
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)µ−i(v
′
−i) = ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v
′
−i)µ−i(v−i) = 0.
en ζ∗
i
(v′
i
, vi ; v−i) must be zero, as there exists v
′
−i such that µi(v
′
−i) > 0. Hence in such special cases,
we can safely define ζ˜i(v
′
i
, vi) = 0 and similarly η˜i(vi) = 0.
In the meanwhile, such a construction ensures that (i) its objective value in BLP being the same as the
objective value of δ∗ in DSLP
obj(δ˜) = obj(δ∗),
and (ii) δ˜ is also a feasible solution to Dual BLP (we omit the further verification here, which is straight-
forward by the definitions)
ζ˜i(v
′
i, vi)µ−i(v−i) = ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i) η˜i(vi)µ−i(v−i) = η
∗
i (v).
erefore, we conclude that DSIC = BIC:
obj(δ˜) ≥ obj(δ¯∗) ≥ obj(δ∗) = obj(δ˜),
where δ¯∗ is any optimal solution to Dual BLP and the last inequality is due to the fact that BIC ≥ DSIC. 
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5 e I.I.D. Setting
In this section, we further show that if the value distributions are i.i.d. and 0 is in the supports, then the
previous characterization implies that DRev = SRev. In the meanwhile, since separate selling employees
agent-independent virtual values, DRev = SRev directly implies that BRev = DRev = SRev. In other
words, although BRev ≥ DRev ≥ SRev in general, any two of them being equal implies that all of them
are equal:
Corollary 5.1. For n ≥ 3,
BRev = DRev or DRev = SRev or SRev = BRev =⇒ BRev = DRev = SRev.
In fact, we have the following theorem:
eorem 5.2. In the i.i.d. value seing with n ≥ 3, if the optimal DSIC auction is induced by agent-
independent virtual values, there exist item-independent (and agent-independent) virtual values inducing an
optimal DSIC auction.
e agent-independent virtual values are called item-independent, if
∀vi, v
′
i ∈ Vi, ϕ
j
i
(vi, v
−j
i
) = ϕ
j
i
(vi, v
′−j
i
) or ϕ
j
i
(vi, v
−j
i
), ϕ
j
i
(vi, v
′−j
i
) ≤ 0.
In particular, Corollary 5.1 directly follows from eorem 5.2:
• if virtual value ϕ
j
i
is restricted to depending on v
j
i
only, separate selling via Myerson’s auction would
be the optimal (hence BRev = DRev =⇒ BRev = DRev = SRev);
• if DRev = SRev, then the optimal DSIC auction can be induced by agent- and item-independent
virtual values, implying DSIC = BIC (hence DRev = SRev =⇒ BRev = DRev = SRev);
• if SRev = BRev, then by BRev ≥ DRev ≥ SRev, all of them must be equal (hence SRev = BRev =⇒
BRev = DRev = SRev).
We then move to the proof of eorem 5.2, which relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3 (Upper Bounded Virtual Values). ϕ
j
i
≤ v
j
i
.
Proof of eorem 5.2. We prove by contradiction. Assume that the virtual values are not item-independent.
Note that the valuations are i.i.d., hence, without loss of generality, we assume that the virtual values for
the agents are the same and the allocations are symmetric. Hence we also omit the subscripts of virtual
values throught the proof.
In particular, let v¯ j denote the maximum value of the j-th item in the support and v
j
0 denote the value
profile with all maximum value except that the value of the j-th item being 0:
v
j
0 = (v¯
1, . . . , v¯ j−1, 0, v¯ j+1, . . . , v¯m).
Consider vi, v
′
i
and j such that ϕ j(v
j
i
, v
−j
i
) and ϕ j(v
j
i
, v′
−j
i
) are different, i.e.,
ϕ j(v
j
i
, v
−j
i
) < ϕ j(v
j
i
, v′
−j
i
) and ϕ j(v
j
i
, v′
−j
i
) > 0. (7)
Let v = vi and v
(−j)
= (v
j
i
, v′
−j
i
). Pick an arbitrary buyer i′ , i and fix her values being v
j
0 . en fix the
values of all the remaining buyers (except for i and i′) being v, i.e.,
vi′′ = v, ∀i
′′
, i, i′.
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Note that the virtual values of buyer i′ are already determined. According to the definition of agent-
independent virtual values:
ϕ
j
i
(vi) = v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi)(v
j
i
− v′
j
i
)/µi(vi),
we have that ϕ j(v
j
0) ≤ 0 and ϕ
j′(v
j
0) ≥ v¯
j′ for j ′ , j. Combining with Lemma 5.3, we further have that
ϕ j
′
(v
j
0 ) = v¯
j′ for j ′ , j.
en consider the two cases where vi is either v or v
(−j).
• In both cases, the allocations of item j ′ , j won’t change, because either item j ′ is always allocated
to buyer i′ or always allocated uniformly at random.
• vi = v. In this case, all the buyers except i
′ have the same value and hence the same allocation. In
particular, they will get 1/(n − 1) of item j.
• vi = v
(−j). In this case, according to the assumption (7), buyer i has the highest (positive) virtual
value on item j and will be allocated the entire item. To ensure that buyer i in this case won’t have
incentive to misreport her values as v, she will be charged v
j
i
(n−2)/(n−1) for the extra (n−2)/(n−1)
fraction of item j comparing with the previous case.
Given the previous analysis, if buyer i has any value v′ with v′
j
i
> v
j
i
, misreporting her value as v is strictly
dominanted by misreporting as v(−j). Due to the complementary slackness condition (DSCS),
ζ∗(v′, v) = 0,
which implies that
ϕ j(v) ≥ v
j
i
.
By the assumption (7) and Lemma 5.3, we get a contradiction:
v
j
i
≤ ϕ j(v) < ϕ j(v(−j)) ≤ v
j
i
.

6 Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For condition (1), if µ−i(v−i) = 0, then µ(v) = 0, and we can simply let
∀vi, v
′
i ∈ Vi, ζ
∗
i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i) = η
∗
i (v) = 0.
By doing so, δ∗ is still a feasible solution to the dual program, and the objective value does not change.
Hence the optimality is preserved. Moreover,
φ∗
j
i
(v) = η∗i (v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζ∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
= 0,
as desired by (1).
In addition, when vi = 0, µi(0) = 0, and µ−i(v−i) > 0,
φ∗
j
i
(v) = η∗i (v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζ∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
= −
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
≤ 0.
For condition (2) and (3), we do the following changes:
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• ∀v ∈ V , i ∈ [n], vi , 0,
η˜∗i (v) = 0 and η˜
∗
i (0, v−i) = µ−i(v−i),
ζ˜∗i (vi, 0; v−i) = ζ
∗
i (vi, 0; v−i) + η
∗
i (v) and ζ˜
∗
i (0, vi ; v−i) = ζ
∗
i (0, vi ; v−i) + β
∗
i (v).
• All others remain the same.
en we verify one by one that (i) the constructed δ˜∗ is still feasible (δ˜∗ ∈ D), (ii) regularization
condition (2) and (3) are satisfied, and (iii) the objective remains the same (obj(δ˜∗) = obj(δ∗)).
1. δ˜∗ ∈ D: clearly, all the variables in δ˜∗ are still non-negative.
en we show that for vi , 0, φ˜∗
j
i (v) = φ
∗ j
i
(v):
φ˜∗
j
i (v) = η˜
∗
i (v)v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
(
ζ˜∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζ˜∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
= (η˜∗i (v) + ζ˜
∗
i (vi, 0; v−i))v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
,0
(
ζ˜∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζ˜∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
− ζ˜∗i (0, vi ; v−i)0
= (η∗i (v) + ζ
∗
i (vi, 0; v−i))v
j
i
+
∑
v′
i
,0
(
ζ∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i)v
j
i
− ζ∗i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)v
′ j
i
)
− ζ∗i (0, vi ; v−i)0
= φ∗
j
i
(v);
φ˜∗
j
i (0, v−i) ≤ φ
∗ j
i
(0, v−i):
φ˜∗
j
i (0, v−i) = −
∑
v′
i
ζ˜∗i (v
′
i, 0; v−i)v
′ j
i
= −
∑
v′
i
ζ∗i (v
′
i, 0; v−i)v
′ j
i
−
∑
v′
i
η∗i (v
′
i, v−i)v
′ j
i
≤ φ∗
j
i
(0, v−i);
for vi , 0, ψ˜
∗
i
(v) = µ(v):
ψ˜∗i (v) = η˜
∗
i (v) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ˜∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ˜
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
= η˜∗i (v) + ζ˜
∗
i (vi, 0; v−i) +
∑
v′
i
,0
(
ζ˜∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ˜
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
− ζ˜∗i (0, vi ; v−i)
= η∗i (v) + ζ
∗
i (vi, 0; v−i) +
∑
v′
i
,0
(
ζ∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
− ζ∗i (0, vi ; v−i) − β
∗
i (v)
= ψ∗i (v) − β
∗
i (v) = µ(v);
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and finally if µ−i(v−i) = 0, by previous constructions, ψ˜
∗
i
(0, v−i) = 0 = µ−i(v−i); otherwise,
ψ˜∗i (0, v−i) = η˜
∗
i (0, v−i) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ˜∗i (0, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ˜
∗
i (v
′
i, 0; v−i)
)
= µ−i(v−i) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ∗i (0, v
′
i ; v−i) + β
∗
i (v
′
i, v−i) − ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, 0; v−i) − η
∗
i (v
′
i, v−i)
)
= µ−i(v−i) +
∑
v′
i
(
ζ∗i (0, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, 0; v−i)
)
+
∑
vi,0
©­«
∑
v′
i
(
ζ∗i (vi, v
′
i ; v−i) − ζ
∗
i (v
′
i, vi ; v−i)
)
− µ(v)
ª®¬
= µ−i(v−i) −
∑
vi,0
µ(v) = µ(0, v−i).
2. Regularization condition (2): directly implied by construction, and (3): implied by ψ˜∗
i
(v) = µ(v),
which is proved above.
3. e objective remains the same because we did not change variables ξ∗ j(v) at all.

Proof of Lemma 3.6. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3, omied. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Omied. 
7 Interpretations for the Duals
In this section, we provided some interpretations of the dual problems of the revenue maximization prob-
lem under the dominant-strategy implementation and the Bayesian implementation. In particular, they
can be thought as an extended version of the interpretation by Daskalakis et al. [2013, 2015].
To be added.
8 Recover Myerson’s Result for the Single-Item Setting
To be added.
9 Future Work
We plan to entend our results for Section 5 to either (i) independent but non-identical cases, or (ii) contin-
uous distribution cases.
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